Multiagent coordination is a key problem in cooperative multiagent systems (MASs). It has been widely studied in both fixed-agent repeated interaction setting and static social learning framework. However, two aspects of dynamics in real-world MASs are currently neglected. First, the network topologies can change during the course of interaction dynamically. Second, the interaction utilities can be different among each pair of agents and usually unknown before interaction. Both issues mentioned above increase the difficulty of coordination. In this paper, we consider the multiagent social learning in a dynamic environment in which agents can alter their connections and interact with randomly chosen neighbors with unknown utilities beforehand. We propose an optimal rewiring strategy to select most beneficial peers to maximize the accumulated payoffs in long-run interactions. We empirically demonstrate the effects of our approach in a variety of large-scale MASs.
INTRODUCTION
Multiagent coordination in cooperative multiagent systems (MASs) is a significant and widely studied problem. It requires agents to have the capability of coordinating with others effectively towards desirable outcomes. A wide spectrum of works have studied the multiagent coordination problems in cooperative MASs [4, [6] [7] [8] [9] 11] . One line of research is multiagent social learning that study the multiagent coordination problem among a population of cooperative agents with sparse and local interactions [1, 5, 10, 12, 13, 15] .
However, most existing works under the social learning framework assume that agents are located in a static network. Thus, two aspects of dynamics in real-world MASs are currently neglected. First, the interaction utilities for agent pairs are not necessary to be identical due to the difference of agents' preferences and the contexts they are situated in [2, 16] . Second, the network topologies can be dynamic, i.e. agent changes their interacting partners autonomously. To this end, we study the multiagent coordination in cooperative MASs with taking above two aspects into consideration. We consider a dynamic environment where agents can alter their connections by rewiring, and propose an optimal rewiring approach to select most beneficial peers among all reachable peers to maximize the accumulative payoff during the long-run interactions.
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
We consider a population of agents N , in which each agent i has a set of reachable peers, defined as {O i ∪Ō i }. Agent i can only interact with its neighborhood O i through the connections, and also has a probability φ to be able to establish a new connection to a potential agent j ∈Ō i with cost c i j through rewiring. For each rewiring, an old connection should be broken before establishing a new one to model agents' limited communication ability in practice [16] .
We model the strategic interaction between each pair of agents as a cooperative game. A general form of two-action cooperative games between agent i and j is denoted as
, where u a (or u b ) is the payoff when agent i and j both choose action a (or b) and α (≤ u a (u b )) is the outcome for mis-coordination. To model the uncertainty and diversity of agents' utilities, the coordination payoff u a (or u b ) is sampled from a stochastic variable x a (or x b ) following a cumulative probability distribution
is unique for each game. The value of u a (or u b ) is unknown before interaction and is revealed when the corresponding outcome is reached once. Each agent can observe the actions of its interaction neighbor at the end of each interaction.
OPTIMAL REWIRING STRATEGY
The overall interaction protocol is shown in Algorithm 1, including rewiring phase (Line 2-4) and interaction phase (Line 5-7). if random variable p ≤ φ then 3: Perform rewiring action (including NOOP). Obtain payoff and update its policy. 7: Update neighbor j's action model. 8: 
Estimation of Expected Interaction Payoff
The expected payoffs of agent i interacting with j according to an known or unknown payoff matrix G 
Agent j's policy p j i can be estimated from historical actions.
K-Sight Index and Rewiring Strategy
Each agent's situated environments are continuously changing due to rewiring and thus we model it as an Markov Decision Process. Each state s of agent i can be represented as a tuple ⟨Ō i , y i ⟩, with the set of potential peersŌ i and the current baseline value y i = min j ∈O i v j i . With a long sight, the K-step utility function U K (π * i , s) of an optimal strategy π * i is formulated as,
To compute the optimal policy in Equation 3, inspired from Pandora's Rule [14] and Negotiation Problem [2] , we calculate the K-sight rewiring index Λ j i as follows,
where y i ′ is the new baseline value after rewiring and F j i (x) is the distribution of x j i (Equation 2). The benefit index Λ j i captures the relevant information about agent j: it should be rewired when it has the highest positive value of the accumulated net benefit in the following K rounds interaction.
Thus, we propose K-sight rewiring strategy: at each rewiring phase, an agent i first calculates the interaction baseline value y i . Second, for each potential peer j ∈Ō i , the index Λ 
Interaction Strategies
We consider three representative learning strategies in interaction phase, i.e., Fictitious play (FP), Joint-Action Learner (JAL) [4] and Joint-Action WoLF-PHC (JA-WoLF) [3] .
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS
To evaluate our K-sight rewiring strategy (Optimal), we compare it with two benchmark strategies, i.e., Random and K-sight Highest Expect (K-HE) that rewires the agent with the highest positive value of K-round expected payoff minus the cost.
First, we conduct experiments under different topologies for each rewiring strategy. The average accumulated payoff over 1000 rounds of each agent are shown in Figure 1 . We can observe that our optimal rewiring strategy outperforms benchmark strategies in terms of average, best and worst cases across all settings. Second, in Figure 2 Moreover, we analyze the performance of three interaction strategies with our rewiring strategy. Figure 2(b) shows the average single-round interaction payoffs of each agent during the longterm interaction. We can observe that FP strategy can fast reach a good payoff level while JAL and JA-WoLF outperform FP in the long term due to their better convergence on optimal Nash equilibrium.
